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The Vulture program is an initiative being developed by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA).  The end goal of the Vulture program is to develop a high 
altitude long endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that is capable of 
maintaining a 1,000-pound payload on station for five years.  The DARPA goals for the 
Vulture program include, at a minimum, the development and demonstration of advanced 
reliability technologies for the proposed future Vulture system.  It is envisioned that 
Vulture will provide affordable, persistent coverage over an area of interest for 
surveillance and communications relay missions. 
 The purpose of this study is to estimate the potential cost savings and identify 
other benefits associated with the potential operational use of Vulture.  This study 
conducts a business case analysis (BCA) comparing the estimated costs of the Vulture 
program to those of the Global Hawk and Global Observer systems.  Sensitivity analyses 
are performed on the cost variables, as well as a general risk assessment for Vulture. 
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The Vulture program is a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiative to 
develop a high altitude long endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capable 
of maintaining a 1,000-pound payload on station for five years. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the potential cost savings and other 
benefits associated with the potential operational use of Vulture.  This study establishes 
three potential operational scenarios (Trans-Sahara Region, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and 
China/North Korea) in which persistent surveillance would be required and develops a 
business case analysis for Vulture.  Using these three operational scenarios, the business 
case analysis proceeds by completing the following: 
 Baseline analysis and comparison of fleet requirements and net present 
value (NPV) life cycle costs (LCC) for Vulture, Global Hawk, and Global 
Observer systems 
 Return on investment analysis for Vulture in comparison to Global Hawk 
and Global Observer 
 Sensitivity analysis of several cost factors on the life cycle cost and return 
on investment comparisons 
 Risk assessment analysis for Vulture 
The results of the business case analysis of the three systems to perform the 
persistence surveillance mission in the operational scenarios for 15 years are summarized 
as follows: 
 Fleet Requirements 
o 4 total Vulture aircraft are required to support the mission 
requirements.  In comparison, 20 Global Hawk aircraft would be 
required, or 11 Global Observer aircraft would be required 
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o 4 Vulture sorties every five years, 2152 annual Global Hawk 
sorties, or 277 annual Global Observer sorties are required 
 Life Cycle Costs 
The estimated net present value life cycle comparison over a 15-year period 
between Vulture, Global Hawk, and Global Observer are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Estimated NPV life cycle costs (FY10 $M) over 15 years  
to support the scenarios. 
o The estimated NPV cost to purchase and operate the Vulture for 15 
years in the three operational scenarios identified is $1,618M 
(FY10$) 
o The expected NPV life cycle cost savings of using Vulture over 
Global Hawk is 68% 
o The annualized return on investment of Vulture versus Global 
Hawk is 5.23%. 
 Sensitivity Analysis 
o Vulture becomes an increasingly more attractive option over 
Global Hawk as mission distance is increased 
o Vulture air vehicle cost is the major driver of Vulture life cycle 
costs 
o The future cost of solar energy technology will be a major driver of 
Vulture air vehicle costs, and therefore, life cycle costs 
Cost Category Global Hawk Vulture Global Observer
Investment 2,549.64 1,618.49 251.74 
Operations & Support 2,547.47 0.00 228.38 
Total NPV LCC Cost 5,097.11 1,618.49 480.12 
 3
o As Vulture estimated total air vehicle costs approach $200M per 
unit, Vulture is no longer an attractive option to Global Hawk from 
an annualized return on investment point of view 
 Risk Analysis 
o Power generation and component longevity for an atmospheric five 
year endurance system are primary technological risk areas 
o Vulnerability and susceptibility assessments may reveal attrition 
risks that will greatly increase program life cycle costs 
o Low technology readiness level of the proposed system increases 
the design maturation risk 
Based on the cost and benefits estimated in this analysis, the Vulture program will 
perform the persistent surveillance mission at a lower cost than the Global Hawk system.  
This analysis also reflects the Vulture currently as a more expensive option than Global 
Observer.  Future study is recommended, among others, on the comparison between 
Vulture and Global Observer as both developmental systems continue to mature and 
estimated costs become more accurate.  Given the potential savings Vulture provides 
over the existing Global Hawk system, there are significant potential benefits to be 
garnered by pursuing the Vulture program and continuing to evaluate its attractiveness as 
the technology and design matures. 
 
 4
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 This study provides a business case analysis (BCA) that estimates and compares 
the costs of acquiring and operating the developmental Vulture unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV) to those of the Global Hawk and Global Observer.  Department of Defense (DoD) 
demand for technology is outpacing DoD’s ability to support requirements.  Two notable 
examples are intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) taskings and command, 
control, and communications (C3) bandwidth requirements.  Meeting the increasing 
demand for ISR and C3 assets will enable improvements in doctrine, and ultimately, 
force effectiveness, but it is important to meet the demand in the most cost effective way.  
Augmenting these requirements with additional assets as currently employed would be 
more costly than current operations, and additional assets may take an excessive amount 
of time to field.  High altitude long endurance (HALE) UAVs capable of supplementing 
current capabilities and relaying communications may be a promising solution. 
A recent DoD initiative to provide additional ISR and C3 capability is the Vulture 
program, which is managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA).  The Vulture program’s end product will be a HALE UAV capable of 
maintaining a 1,000-pound payload on station for 5 years.  Three contractors competed in 
the first phase of the Vulture program to build a subscale model of their respective 
solutions.  Recently, The Boeing Company won DARPA’s Vulture Phase II contract to 
build a full scale demonstrator (FSD).  Thus, for the purposes of this report, the Vulture 
program’s final product is generically referred to as “Vulture.”  According to DARPA, 
The Vulture air vehicle program is an exploratory development program to 
develop the capability to deliver and maintain a single airborne payload on 
station for an uninterrupted period of at least 5 years using a heavier-than-
air platform system.  It is envisioned that this program will, at a minimum, 
develop and demonstrate advanced reliability technologies for air vehicle 
systems.  Other advanced technologies may also be developed and 
demonstrated depending upon the nature of the architectures proposed by 
offerors…  The Vulture program will research and develop technologies 
and systems which will enable the military to deliver and maintain a 1000 
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lb, 5 kW airborne payload for an uninterrupted period of at least 5 years 
with an on-station probability of 99% and with a high probability of 
mission success.  The architectures selected and the specific approaches 
taken by the offerors will determine the range of technical areas that are 
developed, including, but not limited to, environmental energy collection, 
high specific energy storage, extremely efficient propulsion systems, 
precision robotic refueling, autonomous materiel transfer, extremely 
efficient vehicle structural design, and mitigation of environmentally-
induced loads.1 
Further, DARPA is very straightforward in its constraints on Vulture’s propulsion.  It 
specifically states, “The Government is not interested in approaches that use either 
radioactive energy sources or employ any form of buoyant flight for this application.”2 
 This study will use Lim’s methodology employed in his Global Observer BCA 
thesis3 to examine the cost savings and other benefits gained by the acquisition and 
operational use of Vulture.  This MBA Professional Report conducts the Vulture program 
business case analysis with a baseline analysis, sensitivity analysis, and a general risk 
assessment for Vulture.  The BCA compares the performance of Vulture with Global 
Hawk and Global Observer in three operational scenarios performing 24/7/365 ISR and 
communications missions.  Life Cycle Costs encompass investment costs as well as 
operating costs over a 15-year period in this analysis. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
There is increasing pressure on DoD to cut costs.  The FY 2011 President’s 
Budget requests $708.2 billion for DoD, including $548.9 billion in Base funds and 
$159.3 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds.4  Acquisition reform 
                                                 
1Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Vulture Program:  Broad Agency Announcement 
(BAA) Solicitation 07-51, (Arlington, VA: DARPA/TTO, 2007). 
<https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=5bffbe1738e2769b8e8b99d8e6e29b2e&tab=core
&_cview=1> (2 June 2010), 4. 
2 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, BAA Solicitation 07-51, 4. 
3Thiow Yong Dennis Lim, “A Methodological Approach for Conducting a Business Case Analysis 
(BCA) for the Global Observer Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)” (M.S. thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007). 
4 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request Overview. February 2010, (Washington, 
D.C.:  OUSD(C), 2010), 1–1. 
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continues to be a major issue as DoD attempts to use the authorized budget more 
effectively and efficiently, and efforts are being made to improve financial transparency 
and oversight.5  To that end, system life cycle costs will be increasingly important when 
deciding a program’s cost effectiveness over its life.  UAVs are no exception to this 
requirement. 
1. High Cost of Global Persistent Surveillance 
Providing persistent surveillance with ISR satellites or the current UAV fleet 
requires additional assets to support such mission needs.  Because ISR satellites orbit the 
earth in non-geostationary orbits, they do not loiter over a specific area.  To task ISR 
satellites with a “real-time” requirement, there must be several of them on orbit in a 
particular ISR system.  Individual satellites require at least one orbit to be repositioned.    
Once they are placed on orbit, there is comparatively little upkeep, which is primarily 
station keeping and tasking.  Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and 
procurement expenses make up the bulk of the satellite costs.  These costs alone can 
range in the billions of dollars per satellite. 
Current operational ISR UAVs use fossil fuels as a source of power, meaning they 
can only stay aloft for one to two days.  Developmental UAVs, such as Global Observer 
and Zephyr, can stay aloft for one to two weeks.  In either case, this contrasts sharply 
with satellites operating on orbit for over a decade and Vulture remaining aloft for 5 
years.  Achieving 24/7/365 persistent surveillance in a given area with current UAVs 
would be costly due to the sheer number of sorties required, amount of fuel consumed, 
burden of logistics, and amount of maintenance necessitated by their heavy use. 
2. Shortage of DoD Communications Bandwidth 
DoD has an increasing need for capacity to transmit data, or bandwidth.  The 
Pentagon maintains several satellite systems for its high priority communications, but for 
years, DoD has not had enough satellites to relay all of its communications-related audio, 
                                                 
5 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request Overview. February 2010, (Washington, 
D.C.:  OUSD(C), 2010), 1–3. 
 8
video, and digital data.  It has had to lease commercial satellite communications capacity 
to support the bulk of its lower priority communications.  As shown in Figure 1, 
commercial communications satellite use has been growing steadily in both bandwidth 






























Figure 1.   Growth of DoD use and expenditures on  
commercial communication satellite service.6 
DoD-leased satellite bandwidth is not expected to decrease until systems such as 
the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System (MOUO) and the Air Force’s Advanced 
Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) and Wideband Global SATCOM System (WGS) 
satellites are launched and activated.  The majority of the satellite launches are tentatively 
scheduled to begin in 2011.7  Even once these assets are deployed, the likelihood exists 
that requirements will outpace newly acquired capabilities. 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
To accomplish the goals outlined in section A, this BCA used the methodology 
developed by Lim in his BCA of the Global Observer UAV.8 
                                                 
6 Defense Information Systems Agency, Commercial SATCOM Update, (Arlington, VA:  SATCOM 
PMO, 2009), 18. 
7 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon 
System, (Washington, D.C.:  OUSD(C), 2010), 7–2, 3, 8. 
8 Lim, “Global Observer,” 7. 
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As with any analysis, the accuracy of this BCA’s results is dependent on the 
accuracy of the data sources.  The estimated cost savings, though specific to the 
operational scenario, can be used to estimate the savings for similar scenarios. 
Basic assumptions made for this analysis include: 
 Whenever a choice is made between higher and lower costs due to 
ambiguous data, the higher cost was used for Vulture to support 
conservative conclusions. 
 Where information was not available, estimates were used based 
on reasonable assumptions. 
 10




 This section provides pertinent background information to assist the reader in 
understanding the BCA.  First, persistent ISR and C3 capabilities are defined in the 
context of DoD requirements.  Second, current technologies employed for surveillance 
and reconnaissance are addressed in the form of UAVs and satellites and how they relate 
to persistent ISR and augmenting communications.  Third, emerging technologies in high 
altitude airships are presented in the same light.  Fourth, the fundamentals of solar power 
technology and its integration with UAVs are discussed.  Fifth, DARPA’s Vulture 
program is described. 
A. PERSISTENT SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATIONS 
BANDWIDTH 
Authorized ISR taskings push the limits of current ISR systems, and requests for 
ISR taskings exceed current DoD capabilities.  “Surveillance” is defined by DoD as “the 
systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or 
things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.”9  What commanders in 
theater want is “persistent surveillance,” defined by DoD as: 
A collection strategy that emphasizes the ability of some collection 
systems to linger on demand in an area to detect, locate, characterize, 
identify, track, target, and possibly provide battle damage assessment and 
retargeting in near or real-time. Persistent surveillance facilitates the 
prediction of an adversary’s behavior and the formulation and execution of 
preemptive activities to deter or forestall anticipated adversary courses of 
action.10 
Persistent surveillance requires a continual tasking burden on ISR assets.  Current 
ISR assets are either space-based and used by many organizations and agencies, or they 
are airborne and do not have the ability to loiter on station long enough to provide this 
persistence without flying multiple sorties. 
                                                 
9 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through April 2010) (Washington, D.C.: J-7, 2010), 456. 
10 Ibid., 358. 
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Another area of concern to DoD is that bandwidth requirements for C3 also 
exceed capabilities provided by current systems.  “Bandwidth,” for the purposes of this 
paper, refers to the data transmission rate rather than a band of frequencies dedicated to a 
particular communication system.  After orbital insertion of satellites, technology 
continues to evolve on the ground, fostering new requirements for digital communication 
capabilities as well as an ever-increasing demand for communication bandwidth.  DoD 
dedicated satellite constellations operated by the United States Air Force (USAF) handle 
the majority of high priority DoD communications, but they are rapidly becoming 
obsolete in technological capability.  Newly employed technologies on the ground require 
higher data rates for transmission of real-time video, battlefield maps, and targeting data 
in support of tactical military operations.11  As a result, DoD is turning to the commercial 
sector to satisfy its bandwidth requirements.  As Rosenberg writes, “Industry experts 
estimate that 80 percent of all satellite bandwidth that the Defense Department uses is 
purchased by the Defense Information Systems Agency from companies such as 
Inmarsat, Intelsat and Iridium.  That percentage is expected to climb north of 90 percent 
in the near future.”12 
B. CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES 
There are three primary types of technologies either being used or being 
developed for DoD’s surveillance and communication purposes.13  These are: 
 Fossil-fueled UAVs (flexible deployment, but limited loiter capability) 
 Satellites (inflexible deployment, but persistent loiter capability) 
 High Altitude Airships (relatively flexible deployment, with persistent loiter 
capability) 
                                                 
11 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification. May 2009, 
(Washington, D.C.: OUSD(C), 2009), 1–50. 
12 Barry Rosenberg, “DOD’s Reliance on Commercial Satellites Hits New Zenith,” Defense Systems, 
25 February 2010, <http://www.defensesystems.com/Articles/2010/03/11/Cover-story-The-Satcom-
Challenge.aspx> (3 June 2010), 1. 
13 Lim, “Global Observer,” 9. 
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These technologies are presented along with their pros and cons to illustrate their utility 
in performing persistent surveillance and communication bandwidth augmentation 
missions. 
1. Fossil-Fueled UAVs 
As the name implies, unmanned aerial vehicles are aircraft that fly without a 
human onboard.  They are reusable aircraft that are either remotely piloted or 
programmed to fly autonomously in a pre-designated flight plan.  UAVs are rapidly 
deployed and capable of carrying an array of payloads, making them vital sensor assets.14  
The primary attraction of UAVs is that they present no risk of losing a pilot, and they can 
perform missions that would be considered undesirable by pilots. 
Some UAVs currently being used by the DoD include the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 
Reaper, and RQ-4 Global Hawk.  Such UAVs, which are capable of supporting payloads 
for ISR and C3 missions, burn hydrocarbon fuels.  They are designed to perform a 
mission, or tasking, and return to base.  They are not designed with the ability to be 
refueled in-flight.  This means they have a range or loiter time limited to the amount of 
fuel they can carry, which for typical medium and high altitude UAVs, is limited to 
between one and two days.  To maintain persistent surveillance and communication relay, 
these UAVs would need to fly a large number of sorties.  This translates into increased 
operational costs due to high fuel consumption, increased maintenance, and constant 
operational burdens. 
2. Satellites 
Satellite constellations designed for a specific mission (such as ISR or 
communications) are capable of persistent 24/7/365 coverage.  A single satellite, because 
it must orbit the earth, typically passes out of the line of sight with respect to a ground 
observer, and thus is not capable of persistent 24/7/365 coverage.  A geosynchronous 
satellite is an exception to this, but such a system is beyond the scope of this professional 
report.  In essence, single satellites are capable of increasing the mission capability of a 
specific system, but alone do not guarantee persistent coverage.  Because satellites must 
                                                 
14 Lim, “Global Observer,” 9. 
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be operated in conjunction with similar satellites to obtain 24/7/365 on-station capability, 
they must be designed and procured with the intent of interoperability. 
Further complicating the cost of satellite systems is the fact that a satellite 
acquisition program must accomplish a plethora of tasks related to engineering, 
fabricating, testing, and integrating components and technologies.  Though contractors 
are described as developing “prototypes,” it is worth noting that these “prototypes” are 
the actual satellites that will be placed on orbit for operational use.  Of course, this is 
following successful completion of a series of rigorous tests to determine operational 
functionality as well as launch and environmental survivability.  It is not economically 
feasible to create satellites that will not be used.  Where the construction and procurement 
of a UAV is measured in millions of dollars, satellite construction and procurement is 
measured in billions of dollars.   
For example, there are significant outlays for the AEHF communications satellite 
program for RDT&E and procurement.  These amounts are broken out in Table 2.  The 
total cost for the 12-year AEHF program to date, including the latest costs for FY10, is 
approximately $8.5 billion.  This amounts to just over $2.1 billion for each of the four 
planned AEHF satellites.15  This figure will grow substantially with additional RDT&E, 
integration, satellite component procurement, subsequent launches, and future operational 
costs. 
Table 2.   AEHF program budget breakout per FY ($M).16 17 
FY 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010*
RDTE 37.2 54.6 89.8 229.8 459.6 802.6 775.8 607.3 639.2 617.3 612.3 386.4 464.3
Procurement 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 78.2 521.9 0.0 149.9 165.6 1843.5
Total Per FY 37.2 54.6 89.8 229.8 459.6 802.6 775.8 685.5 1161.1 617.3 762.2 552.0 2307.8  
*Indicates latest available FY10 budget information as of publication of this paper. 
                                                 
15 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2006-2010 Budget Request Summary Justifications, 
(Washington, D.C.: OUSD(C), 2005–2009). 
16 Department of Defense, Program Element # 0603430F:  Advanced EHF MILSATCOM (Space), 
(Washington, D.C.: USAF, Feb. 1999–May 2009). 
17 Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2006–2010. 
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Other limitations to satellites exist as well.  First, they are not retrievable.  Once 
they are launched, they must either be used or retired.  Second, they must be designed for 
a specific purpose; they cannot be physically upgraded or maintained on orbit.  This 
means satellites are very susceptible to becoming obsolete due to their inability to keep 
up with technological advances.  Third, placing them on orbit carries considerable risk.  
Launch failures cause the loss of a satellite before orbital insertion, and vibration damage 
from launch could result in an unusable or only partially mission capable space vehicle.  
Finally, the space environment degrades satellites over time by affecting both hardware 
and software. 
3. High Altitude Airships 
Airships, also known as dirigibles or blimps, have been used by the military since 
the early 1900s.  This technology has been revisited in recent years to investigate support 
to HALE missions.  There are several versions of new airships under development that 
will be (and in some cases are) capable of unmanned flight in scenarios requiring 
24/7/365 time-on-station. 
Lockheed Martin won DARPA’s ISIS program contract.  The company states: 
High Altitude Airship (HAA), an un-tethered, unmanned lighter-than-air 
vehicle, will operate above the jet stream in a geostationary position to 
deliver persistent station keeping as a surveillance platform, 
telecommunications relay, or a weather observer. The HAA also provides 
the Warfighter affordable, ever-present Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance and rapid communications connectivity over the entire 
battle space.18 
Aerostar and its partner, Southwest Research Institute, developed the Composite 
Hull High Altitude Powered Platform (CHHAPP), also referred to as the HiSentinel 
airship. It flew a 60 lb payload to 74,000 feet in a five hour flight.19 
                                                 
18 Lockheed Martin, “High Altitude Airship,” Products, 2010, 
<http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/HighAltitudeAirship/index.html> (4 June 2010). 
19 Aerostar International Inc., “Station Keeping Airships,” Near Space Applications, 
<http://www.aerostar.com/aerospace/near_space.htm> (4 June 2010). 
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Although these platforms show a lot of promise for persistent 24/7/365 coverage, 
they are still unproven, and cost related information is not available. 
C. HARNESSING SOLAR POWER FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
Marty Curry noted in a NASA Dryden Fact Sheet, “The first flight of a solar-
powered aircraft took place on November 4, 1974, when the remotely controlled Sunrise 
II, designed by Robert J. Boucher of AstroFlight, Inc., flew following a launch from a 
catapult.”20  Since that time, scientists and engineers have struggled to perfect the 
technology involved with exploiting solar power and integrating that technology into 
unmanned aerial vehicles. 
1. Solar Cells 
Solar cells, also known as photovoltaic (PV) cells, convert sunlight into electrical 
energy through a process known as the PV effect.  A PV cell is composed of two layers 
of different semiconductor materials in contact with each other: an “n-type” negatively 
charged layer, which contains excessive electrons, and a “p-type” positively charged 
layer, which contains an excess of “holes” for electrons to fill.  By placing these materials 
together, a “p/n junction” is formed and creates an electric field.  As solar energy is 
absorbed by the semiconductor materials, electrons are freed from their normal positions 
in atoms of a different or “doped” material.  These electrons move in a direction dictated 
by the electric field towards the “holes” creating an electric current.21 
A typical PV cell only produces a small amount of power, approximately 1 to 2 
watts.  Specific power output depends on the materials used, construction of the cell, and 
the amount and wavelength of light absorbed.  In order to produce enough power to be 
                                                 
20 Marty Curry, “Solar Power Research,” NASA Dryden Fact Sheet, 9 December 2009, 
<http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/FactSheets/FS-054-DFRC.html> (3 June 2010). 
21 Department of Energy, “The Photoelectric Effect,” Solar Energy Technologies Program, 5 January 
2006, <http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/photoelectric_effect.html> (3 June 2010). 
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useful in any practical sense, many solar cells are connected to form a module, and 
multiple modules are connected together to form an array.22 
2. Solar Powered UAVs 
Applications for PV technology abound.  In his thesis regarding the Zephyr UAV, 
Kwok stated, 
The range of possible applications of solar energy using PV cells is vast, 
from powering a simple calculator to powering a complex vehicle system. 
Over recent decades, this technology has also been integrated into UAVs, 
so that the flight endurance of UAVs is no longer dependent on the 
quantity of fuel that they can carry onboard, thus increasing their flight 
endurance significantly.23 
Such increased flight endurance is a step forward in achieving the persistence of time on 
station needed for requested ISR taskings as well as to fill C3 gaps. 
D. DARPA VULTURE 
As mentioned earlier, DARPA’s primary goals for the Vulture program are to 
develop a solar powered UAV capable of maintaining a 5 kW, 1,000-pound payload on 
station 99% of the time for five years.  The Vulture program is a three phase program in 
which multiple contractors compete in Phase I to develop the best product, and then one 
contractor proceeds on to Phases II and III.  Aurora Flight Science, Boeing, and 
Lockheed Martin were awarded Phase I contracts.24 
 
                                                 
22 Department of Energy, “PV Systems,” Solar Energy Technologies Program, 30 December 2005, 
<http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pv_systems.html> (3 June 2010). 
23 Kwok Yew Heng, “A Methodological Approach for Conducting a Business Case Analysis (BCA) 
of Zephyr Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD)” (M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008). 
24 Defense Industry Daily, LLC, “DARPA’s Vulture: What Goes Up, Needn’t Come Down,” Defense 
Industry Daily, 30 September 2009, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/DARPAs-Vulture-What-Goes-
Up-Neednt-Come-Down-04852> (2 June 2010). 
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1. Phase I 
According to DARPA, the objectives of Phase I25 were to: 
 Conduct military utility analyses and develop a notional Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and system architecture for the objective Vulture system 
 Conduct design trade studies to develop an objective system conceptual design 
 Develop an affordable full scale demonstration system conceptual design that 
closes around the Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) requirements and is 
derived from the objective system design 
 Develop a detailed technology maturation roadmap that defines a credible 
development program to meet the Vulture Phase II and III objectives 
 Develop a subscale demonstrator conceptual design that will demonstrate key 
enabling technologies and system attributes of the full scale demonstration and 
objective systems 
 Perform formal reliability and mission success analyses of the objective system 
and both demonstrator designs at the major subsystem/operational task level to 
establish the required reliability/mission success goals for the major 
subsystem/operational task level system elements 
 Conduct a System Requirements Review (SRR) for the subscale demonstrator 
system 
Aurora’s Phase I HALE UAV, called “Odysseus,” runs on solar power by day and 
at night uses batteries charged by the solar arrays.  It is a three-piece modular design.  
The three UAVs can dock and separate in midair and have an overall wingspan of 160 
feet.  They can capture more of the sun’s energy in a z-configuration during the day, and 
they can form a straight line for more efficient flight at night.26 
                                                 
25 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, BAA Solicitation 07-51, 6–7. 
26 Defense Industry Daily, LLC, “What Goes Up.” 
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Boeing is partnered with the British firm QinetiQ and has been refining the 
“Zephyr” Phase I HALE UAV.  Its carbon-fiber configuration has a wingspan of 59 feet 
and weighs just 66 pounds.  It is a single aircraft that makes use of amorphous silicon 
solar arrays to generate power during the day and charge its lithium sulfur batteries to run 
at night.27  In July 2010, Zephyr broke the UAV record for longest flight time with a 14 
day and 21-hour flight.28 
Lockheed Martin’s Phase I “solar-powered design is reportedly a single UAV 
over 300 feet long, with tails that rotate to collect the most sunlight and systems that 
capture photovoltaic energy from the Earth’s albedo.  The power feeds electric ring 
motors, which can drive propellers directly at a distance without using heavy 
gearboxes.”29 
2. Phase II 
Phase I was completed in September 2009.  The program is currently in Phase II, 
which has a planned budget of $155 million.  Phase II “seeks to 1) Develop a robust 
system design that maximizes military utility; 2) mature critical enabling technologies; 
and 3) validate through simulation, ground test and flight demonstration that an aircraft of 
this class is achievable.”30 
The minimum objectives for Phase II31 are to: 
 Execute a technology maturation roadmap that systemically reduces performance 
and reliability risks to warrant any potential follow on execution of the Objective 
System development 
                                                 
27 Defense Industry Daily, LLC, “What Goes Up.” 
28 QuinetiQ, “High Altitude Long Endurance UAV - Zephyr,” Unmanned Air Systems, 
<http://www.qinetiq.com/home/defence/defence_solutions/aerospace/unmanned_air_systems/uav.html> 
(29 September 2010). 
29 Defense Industry Daily, LLC, “What Goes Up.” 
30 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Vulture II Program Background Information, 
(Arlington, VA: DARPA/TTO, 2009), 
<https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=050595238d8ebcea9bff6e23d5c8ed70&tab=core&
_cview=1> (2 June 2010), 2. 
31 Ibid., 4–5. 
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 Provide risk reduction through laboratory/field demonstrations of key major 
subsystems ability to achieve reliability/mission success objectives of the 
Objective System requirements 
 Establish a Preliminary Design for the Objective System, from which the FSD 
detail airframe design will be derived 
 Develop a detailed FSD design with traceability to the Objective System 
configurations. FSD should have the capability for recovery and re-launch 
 Document and demonstrate flight airworthiness and conduct a minimum of 30 
days continuous flight demonstration 
 Provide full-scale aircraft flight demonstration and acquisition of 
structural/aeroelastic data and validation of software development design codes 
for objective aircraft design 
 Deliver/update proposed military utility analysis, CONOPS, and a provide 5 year 
mission life cycle cost of the Objective System based on Phase II analysis and 
validations 
 Deliver/update the detailed development approach and technology maturation 
plan  (TMP) necessary to achieve an operational Objective System at the 
culmination of Phase II 
Following the completion of these objectives, the contractor should be prepared to 
move to Phase III.  The Phase II exit criteria32 are: 
 Key Subsystem Risk Reductions 
 Objective and FSD Design 
 FSD Technology Flight Demonstration 
On September 14, 2010, DARPA awarded The Boeing Company an $89 million 
contract to develop and fly a FSD model of its version of Vulture, which Boeing Phantom 
                                                 
32 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Vulture II Program Background, 4. 
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Works has named “SolarEagle.”  The contract stipulates that Boeing will make its first 30 
day demonstration flight above altitudes of 60,000 feet in 2014.  SolarEagle will be a 
high-aspect-ratio UAV with a 400-foot wingspan, which is needed to supply sufficient 
surface area for collecting solar power, as well as provide necessary aerodynamic 
performance.  Major suppliers for Boeing’s effort include Versa Power Systems and 
QuinetiQ, the British corporation that co-created Zephyr with Boeing.33 
3. Phase III 
The contractor will complete and execute their TMP to provide fiscal and 
technical information in support of a long term acquisition strategy.  The objective is to 
conduct a full scale flight test in at least a one year demonstration to validate the system’s 
capabilities.  More detailed Phase III objectives will be developed following the 
evaluation of Phase II results and the contractor’s TMP.34 
E. BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
 A business case analysis (BCA) is a fundamental tool that considers cost and 
other quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors to support investment decisions.35  It 
assesses alternatives by weighing their total costs against their total benefits to arrive at 
an optimal solution.  It considers how the alternatives meet the strategic objectives of a 
project or program, support performance measures, and impact stakeholders.  A BCA 
typically determines:36 
 The relative cost vs. benefits of different support strategies 
 The methods and rationale used to quantify benefits and costs 
 The impact and value of Performance/Cost/Schedule/Sustainment tradeoffs 
                                                 
33 The Boeing Company, “Boeing Wins DARPA Vulture II Program,” Media, 16 September 2010, 
<http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1425> (29 September 2010). 
34 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, BAA Solicitation 07-51, 8–9. 
35 Defense Acquisition University, “Business Case Analysis (BCA)”, Acquisition Community 
Connection, 10 March 2004, <https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=32524> (14 October 2010). 
36 Defense Acquisition University, “Business Case Analysis (BCA).” 
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 Data required to support and justify a performance based logistics strategy 
 Sensitivity of the data to change 
 Analysis and classification of risks 
 A recommendation and summary of the implementation plan for proceeding with 
the best value alternative 
A BCA can be approached as an iterative process, reformatted and updated as 
necessary throughout a program’s life cycle, as the program adapts to changes in the 
business and mission environments.  No two BCAs are exactly alike due to variations in 
objectives, assumptions, constraints, risk and operating scenarios, thus it is necessary for 
a BCA to be customized for its specific case.  As illustrated in Figure 2, a BCA consists 
of four steps: definition, data collection, evaluation analysis, and results presentation. 
 




                                                 
37 Defense Acquisition University, “Business Case Analysis (BCA).” 
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The steps of this process are:38 
1. Definition 
This stage describes the scope of the analysis.  Assumptions and constraints are 
formulated to guide the analysis, and the number of alternatives the BCA will consider is 
set.  At least two alternatives will be considered: adopting a decision, or maintaining the 
status quo. 
2. Data Collection 
In the data collection stage of the BCA, types of data needed are identified and 
classified, data sources are identified, and a methodology is created for obtaining the 
data.  Data that cannot be found is estimated, and the methodology for estimating data is 
clearly explained.  All data is vetted for accuracy and then normalized for comparisons 
(for example, comparing either only constant dollars or only current year dollars). 
3. Evaluation Analysis 
The third phase of the BCA uses the data collected in the previous phase to 
perform the necessary calculations.  Both qualitative and quantitative data are used to 
build a case for each alternative.  The alternatives are then compared to identify the best 
value option, providing the best combination of cost and performance.  A risk analysis 
must also be performed to identify risks and potential mitigation strategies.  This is 
accompanied by sensitivity analyses to determine the effect that changes in individual 
inputs, assumptions, and constraints will have on the model’s output (for example, the 





                                                 
38 Defense Acquisition University, “Business Case Analysis (BCA).” 
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4. Results Presentation 
The final phase of the BCA is the presentation of the results.  Here, conclusions 
are drawn from the output of the evaluation analysis and are based on the initial 
objectives of the BCA.  Quantitative data is presented in graphs and charts.  The 
meanings of all results are clearly explained.  Attention is paid to unexpected, outlying or 
easily misinterpreted results.  Finally, a recommended course of action is presented for 
decision makers, bringing closure to the BCA. 
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III. VULTURE BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this analysis is to compare the benefits of Vulture to those of the 
existing Global Hawk ISR platform and the developmental Global Observer HALE UAV 
platform. 
This section describes the three representative scenarios used to compare the costs 
of Vulture, Global Hawk, and Global Observer.  The Zephyr system was initially 
included in this analysis, but the inclusion was determined to be inappropriate because 
Zephyr is unable to meet the minimum payload requirements of Vulture.  The business 
case analysis compares the costs of these platforms performing continuous operations 
(i.e., round-the-clock ISR and communication relay missions).  The scenarios used in the 
analysis will be explained in section A.  The available data will then be analyzed in 
section B.  This is followed by a computation of the return on investment in section C, 
and sensitivity analyses on the input data and assumptions in section D. 
A. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
The operational scenario of this analysis is based on a strategic employment plan 
of these ISR and communications platforms (i.e., the Vulture, Global Hawk, or the 
Global Observer) over three areas of interest, which relates to the U.S. National Security 
Strategy.  These ISR missions require continuous coverage and may also perform tactical 
battlefield communications missions in the area.  Three operationally realistic scenarios 
were chosen to represent potential long-, mid-, and short-range missions performed by 
the platforms.  The following three regions were used to develop the tasking requirements 
for the analytical scenarios: 
 Trans-Sahara Region: To support the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative 
(TSCI).  This represents the long-range mission. 
 Afghanistan/Pakistan: To support global overseas contingency operations.  This 
represents the short-range mission. 
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 China / North Korea: To maintain U.S. surveillance of nuclear facilities and 
military defenses in the region.  This represents the mid-range mission. 
1. Scenario Information 
The operationally realistic scenarios described below were used in estimating the 
life cycle costs of the ISR platforms. 
a. Trans-Sahara Region  
The deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global Hawk, Global Observer, 
or Vulture) would significantly enhance the U.S. forces’ ISR capabilities in support of 
TSCI.  In addition, with the heavy reliance on commercial satellite communications due 
to the lack of existing ground-based networks, the Vulture would also function as an 
airborne data relay for in-theatre communications.  Due to the large geographical region 
to be covered, the mission requires two UAV assets (based on the UAV sensor footprint) 
to cover this North African region.  The Trans-Sahara Region scenario represents a long 
distance mission requirement. 
b. Afghanistan/Pakistan 
The deployment of an ISR asset (Global Hawk, Global Observer, or 
Vulture) would significantly enhance the U.S. forces’ ISR capabilities for global overseas 
contingency operations in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.  Again, with heavy reliance 
on commercial satellite communications due to the lack of existing ground-based 
networks, Vulture would also function as an airborne communications satellite for in-
theatre communications.  The mission only requires one UAV asset to cover this region.  
The Afghanistan/Pakistan scenario represents a short distance mission requirement. 
c. China/North Korea 
The deployment of a strategic ISR asset (Global Hawk, Global Observer, 
or Vulture) for persistent surveillance of the China/North Korea region would enhance  
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U.S. surveillance of nuclear facilities and military defenses in the region.  The mission 
requires one UAV asset to cover this region.  The China/North Korea scenario represents 
a mid-distance mission requirement. 
2. UAV Operating Bases  
For the purpose of comparison, it is assumed that the Global Hawk, Global 
Observer, the Vulture missions can be launched from either of the following two existing 
Global Hawk operating bases.  These bases are:  
 Anderson Air Force Base (Guam) – Current Global Hawk Forward Operating 
Base  
 Al Dhafra Air Base (United Arab Emirates) – Existing Expeditionary Global 
Hawk Forward Operating Base 
3.  Selection of UAV Operating Base  
Table 3 illustrates the distances from the nearest operating base (rounded to the 
nearest 10 nautical miles) to the various Areas of Operations (AO).  For the purpose of 
computing distances, the following locations were used as proxies for the respective AO:  
 Trans-Sahara Region: Niger-Algeria-Mali boundary  
 Afghanistan/Pakistan: Kabul 
 China/North Korea: Pyongyang 
Table 3.   Selection of operating base to launch the UAV. 
 Area of Operation Nearest UAV Operating Base Distance (nm) 
1 Trans-Sahara Region Al Dhafra AB 2810 
2 Afghanistan/Pakistan Al Dhafra AB 980 
3 China/North Korea Anderson AFB 1860 
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Figure 3 shows the geographical locations of the various AOs and the UAV 
operating bases.  The AOs are represented by dashed ellipses, and the operating bases are 
represented by stars. 
 
Figure 3.   World map with annotation of UAV operating bases and AOs.39 
B.  DATA ANALYSIS 
 The following sections provide an analysis of the data based on the 
aforementioned operational scenarios. 
1.   Minimum Number of UAVs Required for Persistent Surveillance 
A UAV mission sortie typically consists of a launch from its operating base, 
travel time to the designated AO, a loiter period in which the UAV performs the mission, 
and finally the return trip to its operating base for maintenance, refueling and re-launch.  
To perform persistent surveillance, another UAV overlaps this mission so that it arrives at 
the AO just as the first UAV is leaving.  Figure 4 illustrates the typical mission sortie 
profile of a UAV. 
                                                 
39 Central Intelligence Agency, “Political World Map,” The World Factbook, 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/docs/refmaps.html> (10 Sep 10). 
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Figure 4.   Typical UAV mission sortie profile.40 
The number of UAVs required represents the total quantity of vehicles needed to 
ensure 24/7/365 surveillance of the AO, taking into account the typical sortie mission 
duration, as well as required maintenance and mission preparation time. 
Table 4 summarizes the cruise speeds and flight endurance times for Global 
Hawk, Vulture, and Global Observer used in this analysis. 
Table 4.   Cruise speed and endurance times for Global Hawk and Vulture. 
Attribute Global Hawk41 Vulture42 Global Observer43 
Cruise Speed (knots) 335 79 110 
Endurance (hrs) 31 43,800 168 
 
The following assumptions were made in computing the minimum number of 
UAVs required for persistent surveillance of the AO: 
                                                 
40 Lim, “Global Observer,” 37. 
41 Marty Curry, “Global Hawk – Performance & Specifications,” NASA Dryden Fact Sheet, 7 April 
2009, <http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/news/FactSheets/FS-054-DFRC.html> (20 October 2010). 
42 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, BAA Solicitation 07-51, 4. 
43 Lim, “Global Observer,” 37. 
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 The returning UAV will have one hour of spare flight time (i.e., reserve fuel load) 
remaining when it arrives back at base. 
 The time required for maintenance is assumed to take an average of 36 hours after 
each mission sortie for the Global Hawk and Global Observer.  This takes into 
account that maintenance can be as short as a few hours (for normal refueling 
operations), or possibly as long as a week (for complete structural maintenance 
and inspection after the UAV is deployed for a certain number of missions). 
 The Vulture requires no maintenance time because once a Vulture finishes its 
five-year mission it is not expected to be re-used. 
 Weather factors, such as headwind or tailwind, which may affect a UAV’s travel 
time, are not taken into account in the analysis. 
 The time taken to climb to cruise altitude is assumed to be negligible compared to 
the UAV’s flight endurance.  
 Aerial spares for redundant coverage are not required. 
 Global Hawk and Global Observer are assumed to have one ground spare for each 
AO.  Due to the expected mission duration and reliability of Vulture, there is 
assumed to be zero ground spares required for Vulture. 
 Vulture’s sensor footprint (coverage) is assumed to be equal to that of Global 
Hawk and Global Observer.  This assumption is based on Vulture’s intended 
operating altitude of 65,000+ feet while Global Hawk operates at 55,000 feet. 
For each AO, the minimum number of UAVs required for persistent surveillance 






Based on this formula, the UAV fleet size requirements for persistent surveillance 
in each scenario are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Minimum of UAVs required to perform missions in all three scenarios 
simultaneously. 
Scenario Global Hawk Vulture Global Observer 
Trans/Sahara 11 2 5 
Afghanistan/Pakistan 4 1 3 
China/North Korea 5 1 3 
Total Fleet Size 20 4 11 
 
 Based on the three operational scenarios, the total Vulture fleet size to support the 
24/7/365 persistent surveillance requirement is 4 UAVs in any given year.  In 
comparison, 20 Global Hawks or 11 Global Observers would be needed to meet the same 
requirement.  It should also be noted that due to the Vulture’s high ratio of loiter time to 
transit time (more than 1000:1 in all scenarios), additional Vultures are only needed in 
the fleet to cover its transit time once every five years when the Vulture is replaced.  In 
comparison, the ratio of loiter time to transit time for Global Hawk and Global Observer 
is approximately 4:1 and 7:1, respectively.  Given that the Vulture coverage lapse is 
1/300th of the total mission time for each Vulture on average, this study assumes there are 
no spare Vultures in the fleet for any of the scenarios just to cover the transit time once 
every five years.  It is assumed that the use of other resources would be used as a 
supplement during the transit time coverage lapse. 
2. Annual Number of Sorties Required for Persistent Surveillance 
In addition to fleet size, the number of sorties required also has a bearing on the 
total cost of a program.  A higher number of sorties required results in increased 
operating and support costs and a greater risk of take-off and landing mishaps.  The 





Figure 5 represents the annual number of sorties required for each UAV in 
























Figure 5.   Annual UAV sorties required in relation to mission distance. 
For the specific operational scenarios analyzed in this study, Figure 6 reflects the 
number of sorties required by Global Hawk and Global Observer.  A total of 2,152 
Global Hawk sorties or 277 Global Observer sorties would be required each year to 
support the three operational scenarios with 24/7/365 surveillance.  By comparison, a 
total of four Vulture sorties would be required to support the three operational scenarios 
(one for each UAV required in each AO).  Additionally, no further Vulture sorties would 
be required for the next four years, while Global Hawk and Global Observer sortie 



























Figure 6.   Annual sorties required for each scenario. 
3.   Utility of the UAVs 
The utility of a UAV can be defined as the proportion of loiter time to total 




The utilities for Global Hawk, Vulture, and Global Observer are indicated in 
Figure 7.  Due to the high endurance of Vulture, nearly 100% of its mission cycle time is 




















Figure 7.   UAV utility for each scenario. 
4.   Life Cycle Cost 
For this analysis, a UAV program’s life cycle cost consists of investment and 
operations and support (O&S) costs over the life of the program.  It is assumed that the 
life of the program is 15 years in this analysis.  To compute and compare the life cycle 
costs of Vulture, Global Hawk, and Global Observer, several assumptions were made: 
 All costs are computed and presented in FY10 dollars.  Inflation indices were 
provided by SAF/FMCE.44 
 A real discount rate of 2.45% was used to compute net present values.45 
 Investment costs for Global Hawk and Global Observer all occur in Year 0.  It is 
assumed that these aircraft will be useful for the life of the program, no matter the 
usage rate. 
 
                                                 
44 United States Air Force SAF/FMCE, USAF Raw Inflation Indices Based on OSD Raw Inflation 
Rates Base Year (FY) 2010, (Washington, D.C.: SAF/FMCE, 2010). 
45 Office of Management and Budget, “OMB Circular No. A-94 Appendix C,” December 2009, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a094_a94_appx-c> (17 Aug 2010). 
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 Investment costs for Vulture occur every five years to replace the expiring 
Vultures, and prior to the year the air vehicle enters operation.  Therefore, Vulture 
investments for the air vehicles and payloads occur in Year 0, Year 5, and Year 
10.   
 Mission Control Station investment costs for all three UAV systems only occur in 
Year 0 and are operational for the life of the program. 
 Fuel, maintenance, and repair costs are assumed to be the only O&S costs that are 
differentiable between the UAV systems.  Other O&S costs, such as costs 
associated with launches, data links, manpower, etc., are assumed to be equal for 
all systems analyzed. 
 Attrition is assumed to be zero for all systems.  This includes attrition associated 
with take-offs, mission performance, and landings. 
The investment cost category consists of acquisition costs for the air vehicle 
(AV), Mission Control Stations (MCS), and payloads.  The O&S cost category consists 
of costs for fuel, maintenance, and repair.  The basis of cost estimates for each of the 
analyzed costs is listed in Table 6. 
Table 6.   Basis of cost estimates for each UAV system for each cost category. 
Cost Category Global Hawk Vulture Global Observer 
Air Vehicle Actual cost CERs & subject matter expert BCA 
Mission Control Actual cost Analogy to Global Hawk BCA 
Payload Actual cost CERs & assumed cost factor BCA 
Fuel Actual cost N/A Estimated cost 
Maintenance  
& Repair 
10% capital cost N/A BCA 
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A detailed description of each individual cost is broken down in the following 
paragraphs.  Table 8 provides a summary of the total net present value life cycle costs 
estimated in this analysis. 
a.   Air Vehicle Cost 
UAV cost estimating relationships (CERs) provided by the office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Army (Cost & Economics) that were developed from 
traditional fossil-fuel powered UAV data,46 estimate the  cost of a Vulture vehicle to be 
from $6M to $475M based on the given requirements of the system.  Based on the range 
of these estimates, this study assumes the average unit cost of a Vulture AV for the 
production of 12 aircraft (to support the three given scenarios for 15 years) is estimated to 
be $100.0M per AV in the base case.  This average unit cost is the sum of the estimated 
costs of the major components of the Vulture AV.  The solar energy collection and 
storage capability required by the aircraft incurs a significant portion of the cost of the 
total platform.  Assuming an estimated energy requirement of 500 kW for Vulture, and an 
estimated industry average cost of $100 per watt for the solar cells needed to supply and 
store the power, the estimated cost of solar energy collection and storage per air vehicle is 
$50M.  Another $50M is estimated for the costs of structures, avionics, and other 
required equipment and software.47   Sensitivity analysis of these Vulture cost 
assumptions will be performed in Section D to analyze the impacts that alternative cost 
projections have on NPV LCC and ROI computations.   The cost of a Global Hawk is 
$97.7M per AV.48  The cost of a Global Observer is $15.8M per AV.49 
                                                 
46 Deputy Assistant Secretary Army (Cost & Economics), Unmanned Air Vehicle System Acquisition 
Cost Estimating Methodology, (Washington, D.C.: DASA-CE, 2004), 17–23. 
47 Daniel Nussbaum, Vulture BCA Meeting, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 18 October 
2010. 
48 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report:  Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B), 31 December 2009, 
(Washington, D.C.:  OUSD(C), 2010), 26. 
49 Flight International, “Aerovironment Details New Global Observer Variants,” Flight International, 
14 February 2006, <http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2006/02/14/204655/aerovironment-details-new-
global-observer-variants.html> (12 August 2010). 
 37
b. Mission Control Station Cost 
The cost of a Global Hawk MCS is estimated to be $3.3M50 per aircraft 
supported.  It is assumed that an MCS for Vulture is equivalent in complexity and 
requirements per aircraft supported, and therefore, will incur a cost of approximately 
$3.3M per aircraft as well.  The actual cost of a Vulture MCS may be larger or smaller 
than a Global Hawk MCS, but in either case, it is not expected to be a significant cost 
driver as a percentage of total acquisition cost.  The cost of a Global Observer MCS is 
assumed to be $1.6M per air aircraft based on the Global Observer BCA.51 
c.   Payload Cost 
The payload for the Vulture will be required to have an endurance of five 
years since there will be no planned maintenance of the Vulture once launched.  
Therefore, the cost of a payload for Vulture was estimated using the cost per pound of 
current Global Hawk payloads and scaling the cost by a notional extended endurance cost 
factor of five.52 This cost multiplier is intended to capture costs resulting from the higher 
payload reliability and technology required by a five year payload life span.  A sensitivity 
analysis was performed on this scaling factor to understand its impact on the Vulture 
NPV LCC.  The sensitivity analysis can be found in section D.8 of this chapter.  As a 
result, the estimated cost of a Vulture payload is $50.3M.  The average payload cost for 
Global Hawk is $26.5M,53 and the payload cost of Global Observer is $5.5M.54 
d.   Fuel Cost 
The Vulture air vehicle will be completely powered by solar technology 
and will therefore incur zero fuel costs over the life of the aircraft.  To calculate the fuel 
                                                 
50 United States Air Force SAF/FMB, United States Air Force FY11 Budget Estimates Aircraft 
Procurement, Air Force Volume 1, February 2010, (Washington, D.C.: SAF/FMB, 2010). 
51 Lim, “Global Observer,” 43. 
52 Nussbaum, Vulture BCA Meeting. 
53 DoD SAR, Global Hawk (RQ-4A/B), 26. 
54 Lim, “Global Observer,” 43. 
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cost for the Global Hawk and Global Observer systems, their fuel cost per sortie can be 
calculated, and then that cost per sortie can be combined with the annual sortie 
requirements to calculate the annual fuel cost for each system. 
The FY11 cost of JP8 fuel for Global Hawk is $3.03/gallon.55  The 
specific gravity of JP8 is 0.80,56 and the gallon-to-pound conversion rate is 0.120.  
Therefore, the cost of JP8 is $0.29/lb.  A Global Hawk has a fuel capacity of 15,400 
pounds.57  Given these numbers, the cost of fuel per sortie for a Global Hawk is $4,481. 
Global Observer’s per sortie fuel requirements of liquid hydrogen (LH2) 
may be similarly calculated.  The cost for LH2 in FY11 is $3.76/lb.58  Therefore, at a cost 
of $3.76/lb, and a fuel capacity of 1000 pounds,59 the cost of fuel per sortie for a Global 
Observer is $3,760. 
The annual fuel cost for both Global Hawk and Global Observer may be 
estimated by multiplying the cost of fuel per sortie by the number of annual sorties 
required to support the three scenarios.  It is assumed that nearly the entire fuel capacity 
of the aircraft will be used for each sortie.  All fuel not used in transit will be used to 
maximize loiter time to increase aircraft mission utility and decrease total number of 
sorties required (less a negligible remaining amount of reserve fuel).  The annual fuel 




                                                 
55 Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “FY2011 Prices for Publication,” DLA Energy, 
<http://www.desc.dla.mil/DLA%20Energy_files/FY2011_Prices_for_publication.pdf> (14 September 
2010). 
56 Sinclair Oil Corp., “Material Data Safety Sheet,” Sinclair Jet Fuels, December 2005, 
<http://www.sinclairoil.com/msds/Jet%20Fuels.pdf> (16 September 2010). 
57 United States Air Force Factsheets, “RQ-4 Global Hawk,” Air Combat Command, 19 November 
2009. <http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13225> (16 September 2010). 
58 Defense Logistics Agency Energy, “FY2011 Prices for Publication.” 
59 Lim, “Global Observer,” 43. 
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Table 7.   Annual total cost of fuel to support scenarios. 
UAV Cost/lb Capacity (lbs) Cost/sortie Sorties/year Annual Cost
Global Hawk $0.29 15,400 $4,481 2,152 $9.64M 
Global Observer $3.76 1,000 $3,760 277 $1.04M 
The annual costs of fuel to support these aircraft would increase if fully 
burdened fuel costs were used for the calculations. 
e.   Maintenance and Repair Costs 
The Vulture AV will remain in flight for the entirety of its five year 
endurance, and after five years have passed, the Vulture AV will not be recovered.  A 
new AV will be launched in its place.  Consequently, once launched, it is not expected to 
have any maintenance or repairs performed.  Therefore, it is assumed that there will be 
zero maintenance and repair costs to support the Vulture program. 
Analysis of FY05 and FY06 Global Hawk data indicate that the annual 
maintenance and repair costs are approximately 10% of the acquisition cost of the 
operating inventory.60   This ratio is assumed to be equivalent for Global Observer as 
well.  Given this data, the annual maintenance and repair cost is estimated to be $9.8M 
for each Global Hawk and $1.6M for each Global Observer. 
f.   Summary of Costs 
Taking into account these five cost factors and their associated 
assumptions, Table 8 provides the net present value of total life cycle cost (real discount 
factor of 2.45%) in FY10 $M to acquire and operate each respective UAV in the three 
scenarios described over 15 years. 
 
 
                                                 
60 Lim, “Global Observer,” 45. 
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Table 8.   Total life cycle NPV cost to support three scenarios (FY10 $M). 
Cost Element Global Hawk Vulture Global Observer 
Investment Costs    
     Air Vehicle 1,953.51 1,068.40 173.35 
     Mission Control Station 65.38 13.08 17.34 
     Payload 530.76 537.01 61.04 
     Investment Subtotal 2,549.64 1,618.49 251.74 
Operations & Support Costs    
     Fuel 119.84 0.00 12.94 
     Maintenance & Repair 2,427.62 0.00 215.44 
     O&S Subtotal 2,547.47 0.00 228.38 
Total NPV LCC 5,097.11 1,618.49 480.12 
C.   RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
 The return on investment (ROI) analysis was conducted by computing the ROI for 
Vulture when compared with Global Hawk.  Afterwards, several non-quantified benefits 
are provided. 
1.   Vulture-Global Hawk ROI  
The ROI for Vulture in comparison to Global Hawk is based on the net present 
value of life cycle costs of the UAV programs over 15 years to support the three 
scenarios described in Section A of this chapter.  From Table 8, the NPV of life cycle 
savings in comparison to Global Hawk of Vulture are $3,479M, and the NPV of the 
Vulture investment is $1,618M.  The annualized ROI over 15 years can be calculated 
using the following formula: 
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Therefore, the annualized return on investment for Vulture is 5.23% when 
compared to using the Global Hawk for the same mission scenarios over 15 years. 
2.   Non-Quantified Benefits 
In addition to the life cycle costs and savings previously discussed, the Vulture 
platform also has benefits not quantified in this study: 
 High utility rate of mission cycle time (see Figure 7) for Vulture provides 
24/7/365 persistent surveillance with each individual air vehicle. 
 The ability of re-tasking Vulture and positioning it to support quick-reaction 
tactical ground operations. 
 The Vulture platform may be used as a communications relay station in lieu of 
leasing commercial satellite bandwidth. 
 Only one sortie every five years per Vulture essentially eliminates all additional 
manpower and risks associated with maintenance, repair, constant sortie 
generation, takeoffs, and landings that other UAVs incur to support the same 
missions (see Figure 5). 
 Vulture is 100% solar powered, resulting in zero carbon emissions. 
 Improved sensor resolution over space-based assets.61 
 Less required transmit/receive power between connecting devices than 
satellites.62 
 No logistics tail.63  
 Absence of an in-country footprint.64  
                                                 
61 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA’s Vulture Program Enters Phase II,” 15 
September 2010. <http://www.darpa.mil/news/2010/NewsReleaseVultureII.pdf> (2 November 2010). 




D.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 Due to the number of unknowns regarding actual future costs of the Vulture 
program, a variety of sensitivity analyses were conducted to provide a decision maker 
with multiple points of reference when making a program decision.  The cost factors for 
the sensitivity analyses performed and the ranges of values considered are in Table 9. 
Table 9.   Sensitivity analysis cost factors, ranges, and base case values. 
Cost Factor Range of Values Base Case Value 
Discount factor 1% – 7% 2.45% 
Period of analysis 10 – 30 years 15 years 
Mission distances 980 – 2810 nautical miles 980 – 2810 nautical miles 
Additional R&D $0 – $3,000M $0 
Vulture air vehicle cost $50 – $500M $100M 
Cost of solar energy $50 – $500/W $100/W 
Payload endurance cost 
factor 
1 – 7 5 
Cost of JP8 Fuel $2.00 – $4.50/gal $3.03/gal 
 
The effects of these cost factors may be identified by tracking the change in life 
cycle costs of the systems as the cost factor is changed.  Unless stated otherwise, the NPV 
life cycle costs represent the total NPV system costs to support 24/7/365 persistent 
surveillance for the three scenarios discussed (Trans-Sahara, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and 
China/North Korea). 
1.   Discount Factor Sensitivity 
Figure 8 shows how the NPV LCCs of each system are affected by changes in the 
discount factor.  Global Hawk has considerably more costs in the out-years than the other 
systems analyzed.  Its NPV is therefore the most sensitive of the three systems as the 
































































Figure 8.   NPV LCC sensitivity (FY10 $B) to discount rate. 
A change in discount rate within this range would not change the order of 
preference of the three systems from an LCC perspective. 
The change in Vulture ROI with Global Hawk as the base, as discount rate is 























Figure 9.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to discount factor with Global Hawk as the base. 
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2. Period of Analysis Sensitivity 
The period of analysis in the base case is 15 years.  For each additional year of 
analysis, Vulture becomes more attractive in comparison to Global Hawk, but less 
attractive in comparison to Global Observer.  The results of this sensitivity analysis are 
provided in Figure 10.  The Vulture program’s LCC function moves by steps rather than 
linearly as a result of the investment costs that are incurred every five years to replace the 
previous Vulture AVs and payloads.  The other systems do not experience similar steps 
from acquisition costs because as stated previously, an assumption for the investment of 





























Figure 10.   NPV LCC sensitivity (FY10 $B) to period of analysis. 
Figure 11 illustrates the return on investment sensitivity to these varying periods 
of analysis.  As the period of analysis increases, the annualized ROI of Vulture, with 






















Figure 11.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to period of analysis with Global Hawk as the base. 
3.   Mission Distance Sensitivity 
The base case assumes three scenarios of varying lengths.  These scenarios 
consist of a short (Iraq/Afghanistan) mission distance of 980 nm, a mid-range (North 
Korea/China) mission distance of 1860 nm, and a long (Trans-Sahara region) mission 
distance of 2810 nm.  Figure 12 summarizes the NPV LCC costs for each system to 
support one persistent surveillance mission over 15 years.  In this analysis, the base case 
assumption of two UAVs required for the Trans-Sahara region was adjusted to require 































Figure 12.   NPV LCC sensitivity (FY10 $M) to mission distance. 
The costs for Vulture remain constant as mission distance is lengthened because 
its extended endurance requires only one vehicle and one sortie for all distances analyzed.  
The costs for Global Observer only increase a negligible amount as distance increases.  
Additional Global Observer sorties are required, but the cost of those additional sorties 
has a minimal effect on overall cost.  There are no additional Global Observer systems 
required to support the distances analyzed in this sensitivity analysis because the system’s 
mission endurance is still adequate to meet the distance requirements with sufficient 
remaining loiter time.  The costs for Global Hawk increase significantly as mission 
distance increases.  The Global Hawk cost increase is largely the result of nearly two 
times as many annual sorties being required between the short (363 sorties) and long (663 
sorties) missions.  Also, additional Global Hawks must be procured as distance is 
lengthened to cover reduced loiter time at those distances. 
The ROI for Vulture in comparison to Global Hawk can also be computed for 
each mission distance to analyze distances at which Vulture provides a greater return on 
investment.  As seen in Figure 13, Vulture provides a greater return on investment in 























Figure 13.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to mission distance with Global Hawk as the base. 
4. Additional Vulture Research and Development Costs Sensitivity 
The base case assumed no additional Vulture R&D costs would be required for 
the using organization, once acquired.  However, it’s possible that additional R&D costs 
would be incurred by a future program office.  Figure 14 depicts additional R&D costs 






















Figure 14.   Vulture NPV LCC sensitivity (FY10 $B) to R&D costs. 
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Any additional R&D funds are assumed to occur in Year 0 of this analysis.  The 
NPV LCC of Vulture remains lower than that of Global Hawk until approximately an 
additional $3.5B is invested in Vulture R&D.  However, when only $1B of additional 
Vulture R&D is invested, the annualized ROI of Vulture in comparison to Global Hawk 




















Figure 15.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to additional Vulture R&D costs  
with Global Hawk as the base. 
5. Vulture Air Vehicle Cost Sensitivity 
Due to the lack of Vulture O&S costs in the Vulture base case assumption, the 
NPV LCC estimate of Vulture is greatly dependent on the investment cost, and therefore, 
the cost of the Vulture air vehicle.  Given the lack of analogous military systems that 
operate on solar power and for five years with no maintenance, the reliable data with 
which to estimate the eventual air vehicle cost of the Vulture is limited.  For example,   
UAV cost estimating relationships provided by the office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Army (Cost & Economics) that were developed from traditional fossil-fuel 
powered UAV data,65 estimate the  cost of a Vulture vehicle to be from $6M to $475M 
                                                 
65 Deputy Assistant Secretary Army (Cost & Economics), Unmanned Air Vehicle System Acquisition 
Cost Estimating Methodology, (Washington, D.C.: DASA-CE, 2004), 17–23. 
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based on the given requirements of the system.  With this range of cost estimations, the 
Vulture program’s NPV LCC was analyzed for an AV costing between $50M and 



























Figure 16.   Vulture NPV LCC sensitivity (FY10 $B) to air vehicle costs. 
The break-even point for NPV LCC between Vulture and Global Hawk occurs as 
the Vulture AV cost estimate reaches approximately $425M per air vehicle.  As the 
future cost of the Vulture air vehicle becomes better known, Figure 16 may assist in 
determining the attractiveness of Vulture to Global Hawk in NPV LCC terms. 
The ROI of Vulture is also greatly dependent on future air vehicle costs.  It can be 
seen from Figure 17 that as the air vehicle cost of an individual Vulture exceeds 























Figure 17.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to Vulture air vehicle cost  
with Global Hawk as the base. 
6. Air Vehicle and R&D Cost Range of Attractiveness 
 The Vulture air vehicle and R&D cost sensitivities above can be combined to 
estimate a relative range of attractiveness in NPV LCC terms for Vulture in comparison 
to Global Hawk.  The shaded area below the line in Figure 18 represents the estimated 
combinations of Vulture air vehicle and R&D costs that still would result in a NPV LCC 




























Figure 18.   Vulture NPV LCC range of attractiveness for combinations  
of Vulture AV and R&D costs. 
7.   Cost of Solar Energy Sensitivity 
It is expected that the cost to gather and store solar energy will be a major cost 
driver for the Vulture AV cost.  In the base case assumption, it was estimated that the 
cost of solar energy ($50M at $100/W) would be approximately 50% of the total air 
vehicle cost.  Future costs of solar energy may or may not go down as a result of 
commercial and military research and demand.  Figure 19 reflects how the future cost of 
solar energy in $/W would affect the end cost of the Vulture AV.  It assumes a constant 
























Figure 19.   Vulture AV (FY10 $M) cost sensitivity to solar cost. 
8.   Payload Cost Sensitivity 
The cost of the Vulture payload is also a significant cost driver in the NPV LCC 
base case assumption.  With uncertainty regarding the cost of building a reliable payload 
that can operate for five years in Vulture’s operating environment with no maintenance, 
the cost of a Vulture payload is expected to exceed the cost of current 1,000-pound 
payloads, which is approximately $10M.  The base case assumes the cost factor to meet 
this increased reliability requirement is five,66 which results in an approximate cost of 
$50M per payload.  Figure 20 illustrates how the NPV LCC estimate of the Vulture 
program is altered by a change in the payload reliability cost factor.  A range in this cost 
factor of 1 to 7 yields a payload cost range of $10M to $70M. 
                                                 



























Figure 20.   Vulture NPV LCC (FY10 $B) sensitivity to payload cost. 
Just as the NPV LCC of Vulture increases as the Vulture payload cost factor 
increases, the return on investment of Vulture decreases as this cost factor increases.  
Figure 21 shows the change in Vulture ROI, with Global Hawk as the base, as the 






















Figure 21.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to Vulture payload cost factor with Global Hawk as 
the base. 
9.   Cost of JP8 Sensitivity 
Similar to how the future cost of solar energy significantly impacts the NPV LCC 
estimate of Vulture, the future cost of JP8 impacts the NPV LCC estimate of Global 
Hawk to support the three persistent surveillance missions analyzed.  The expected NPV 






















Figure 22.   Global Hawk NPV LCC (FY10 $B) sensitivity to JP8 costs. 
An increase in JP8 costs would also result in a corresponding change in Vulture 
ROI with respect to Global Hawk, as seen in Figure 23.  Based on these two figures, it is 
not expected that a change in cost of JP8 within the relevant range will have a significant 



















Figure 23.   Vulture ROI sensitivity to JP8 costs with Global Hawk as the base. 
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E. RISK ANALYSIS 
 There are several potential sources of cost, schedule, and performance risk for 
Vulture.  These risks relate to technology, threats, supplier capability, design maturation, 
and performance against the development plan. 
1. Technological Risk 
Two of the primary technological areas that increase risk associated with the 
Vulture program are power generation and component longevity.  As seen in section D.7 
of this chapter, the solar power system is a major cost driver to Vulture.  Although solar 
cell technology is proven in space applications, degradation due to atmospheric effects 
such as moisture and fatigue caused by constant wing stresses provides significant risk 
over the life of a Vulture UAV.  Longevity of components is also a major technological 
risk.  The airframe, electric motors, batteries, solar cells, and payloads have to operate 
continuously for five years. 
2. Threat Risk 
Vulture must still undergo vulnerability and susceptibility assessments.  It may 
prove to have a low survivability, making replacement through attrition a major factor in 
the program cost.  This will influence the number of Vulture UAVs required to complete 
a mission as well as the locations of Vulture use. 
3. Supplier Capability Risk 
The industrial capability of future Vulture suppliers presents risk to procurement 
schedules.  The contractor may not be able to keep pace with government demand at a 
competitive price if a large amount of time is necessary to build the UAV.  Likewise, if 
the government must make sudden, unplanned procurements to replace lost vehicles, the 
contractor facilities may be incapable of supporting a sudden increase in output. 
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4. Design Maturation Risk 
Vulture is currently at a very low technology readiness level (TRL).  As future 
R&D is accomplished for HALE UAVs and associated technologies, designs are likely to 
change to incorporate new innovations.  Technological advances following initial 
procurement of Vulture may render it obsolete and justify its redesign.  Likewise, 
changes in design during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase of the 
program may create cost overruns and schedule slips. 
5. Performance Risk 
Performance risk against the program’s development plan is closely associated 
with technological and design maturation risk.  Should a specific performance parameter 
not be met, it must be addressed.  This could include redesign, allowing time for further 
technological development and subsequent redesign.  Performance risk is also an issue 
regarding mission utility of the UAV.  It may be found that Vulture is incapable of 
meeting time on station requirements or longevity requirements, begetting feasibility 
questions of the vehicle in operational use. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This report has presented a basic business case analysis regarding the use of 
Vulture HALE UAVs in lieu of Global Hawk UAVs or Global Observer HALE UAVs to 
maintain 24/7/365 persistent surveillance and battlefield communication capabilities in 
three distinct scenarios.  Life cycle costs in the BCA consist of investment costs and O&S 
costs for each of the considered aircraft. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 Based on the cost and benefits estimated in this analysis, the Vulture program will 
provide improvements in persistent surveillance capability at a lower cost than the Global 
Hawk system.  Also, while the Vulture program appears more expensive than the Global 
Observer program in this estimate, both of these programs are very developmental at this 
point, and total system costs and capabilities may vary significantly from the estimates in 
this BCA.  Further, the support element of Vulture does not entail handling JP8 fuel or 
liquid hydrogen, thereby mitigating associated risks, health hazards, and storage and 
transport issues that are present in the other systems. 
 The Vulture program has the potential to provide a significant new loiter 
capability for HALE UAVs and become a cheaper alternative to communications than 
satellite development or bandwidth leasing.  Additionally, if the requirement for 
persistent surveillance escalates in the future, current technologies would be heavily 
burdened to support this mission.  The Vulture program could relieve existing assets 
(such as the Global Hawk) from hundreds of sorties a year, extending their useful service 
life. 
 The promise of the Vulture program and its technologies are worth continuing to 
pursue at this early point in the program.  It is too early to say whether the Vulture system 
as currently proposed will be a viable military asset when compared to other 
developmental projects.  However, as illustrated by this BCA, there is potential for the 




Following this BCA, it appears that Vulture is a worthwhile investment for 
attaining future “persistent” ISR and C3 mission capability goals and augmenting the 
current UAV fleets.  However, the factors supporting the benefits of Vulture should not 
be limited to those found in this BCA.  The following recommendations provide a more 
comprehensive set of investigations and are presented for future consideration. 
 As design matures, the effect of learning curves on the production of Vulture air 
vehicles should be investigated and applied to the BCA.  Reduction in the 
procurement costs will make Vulture a more attractive option in shorter-range 
scenarios than those discussed in this paper. 
 Relationships between ground control station costs and specific UAV types are 
lacking.  Further inquiry should be made to establish CERs between UAVs and 
ground control stations. 
 In the scenarios described above, it was calculated that the average number of 
required Vulture per mission would be fractionally (1/1000th) larger than the 
specified integer due to transit time requirements at the end of each five year 
Vulture rotation.  It was assumed that the concept of operations would use other 
assets to cover this 30 hour or less surveillance gap by Vulture once every 5 years.  
A sensitivity analysis on the additional cost of different operational decisions to 
support this coverage gap and to perform full persistent capabilities should be 
performed. 
 A BCA evaluating the use of specific types of aircraft versus the use of a mix of 
platforms to accomplish the persistent surveillance mission should be performed. 
 Cost benefit analyses should be performed on the development and procurement 
of configurationally variant Vulture aircraft with respect to airframe size, payload 
capability (footprint), payload weight, design for landing/recoverability, and 
longevity (e.g., 1, 3, or 7 years, versus 5). 
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 ISR and communications payloads should be researched with respect to design for 
use in an atmospheric environment with high reliability for multi-year missions.  
Following this, a sensitivity analysis should be performed on the cost of payload 
versus capability. 
 The threat vulnerability and susceptibility of Vulture will need to be assessed at 
some point.  Such an assessment should be used in a BCA regarding attrition and 
mission survivability. 
 Production facilities have capacity constraints, limiting the number of aircraft 
they can produce in a timely manner.  Such constraints should be investigated 
with respect to specific scenarios and aircraft requirements to recommend 
guidance to future acquisitions as well as mission planning. 
 This paper concerns the utility of Vulture compared with Global Hawk and 
Global Observer.  However, with a 5 year on-station life, a BCA for replacing 
limited amounts of satellite assets should be conducted. 
 Global Observer should be revisited to update cost figures and utility assessments.  
A more comprehensive BCA comparing only Global Observer and Vulture should 
be accomplished as well as an accompanying cost benefit analysis regarding 
liquid hydrogen technology versus solar technology. 
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